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International Institutions and Domestic Politics:
Can Preferential Trading Agreements Help Leaders
Promote Economic Reform?
Leonardo Baccini London School of Economics and Political Science
Johannes Urpelainen Columbia University
How do domestic politics influence the formation of international institutions, and how do international
institutions shape domestic politics? These questions cannot be answered in isolation because national leaders form
and join international institutions to advance their domestic interests. We illuminate the relationship between
international institutions and domestic politics by analyzing whether preferential trading agreements (PTAs)
promote liberal economic reform. In developing countries, leaders engage in PTA negotiations with major powers
(European Union and United States) when these leaders want to implement reforms but cannot do so due to
domestic political opposition and a lack of credible commitment. PTA negotiations promote economic reform
by enabling credible commitment and allowing the leader to condition the implementation of the PTA on
liberal policies.
H
owdo domestic politics influence the forma-
tion of international institutions, and how
do international institutions shape domestic
politics?1,2 These questions cannot be answered in
isolation because national leaders form and join
international institutions to advance their domestic
interests (Poast and Urpelainen 2013; Vreeland
2003). However, the empirical evidence on the role
of international institutions in a leader’s political
calculus remains scant. Although scholars recog-
nize the domestic benefits of joining international
institutions (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Vreeland
2003), existing work has not investigated why indi-
vidual leaders join international institutions at specific
times.
To illuminate the relationship between interna-
tional institutions and domestic politics, we examine
whether leaders in developing countries use prefer-
ential trading agreements (PTAs) with major powers
(European Union and United States) to promote
liberal economic reforms. Economic reforms are
interesting for political scientists because liberaliza-
tion has provoked intense political controversy and
influenced the livelihoods of billions of people
around the world (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).
EU/U.S. PTAs are ideal for studying the role of
international institutions in promoting economic
reform because they are usually bilateral and contain
detailed provisions on economic reform (World Bank
2005).
We argue that leaders engage in PTA negotiations
when they want reform but cannot overcome domestic
political opposition to it. A PTA with a major power
enables credible commitment and increases domestic
support to economic reform, so we expect leaders to
engage in PTA negotiations to promote economic
reforms that would be difficult to implement through
domestic strategies. Operationalizing demand for eco-
nomic reform by recent democratization (Milner and
Kubota 2005) and a leader’s inability to overcome
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1An online appendix for this article is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001278, containing additional empirical
analysis. Data and supporting materials to reproduce the statistical analyses will be made available at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/jop
no later than at the time of the publication of the article.
2By international institutions, we refer to rules and standards codified in formal agreements; no formal international organization is
required.
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domestic political opposition by recent leader change
(Haggard and Kaufman 1997), we find that their inter-
active effect on the probability of PTA negotiations
between a developing country and the EU/US is strongly
positive. Moreover, we show that PTAs induce eco-
nomic reforms across various sectors of the economy.
These findings can inform research on interna-
tional economic institutions and the domestic politics
of economic reform. While previous studies have found
that International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs
(Pop-Eleches 2009; Vreeland 2003) and EU accession
(Mattli and Plu¨mper, 2004) promote economic reform,
our findings show that more flexible bilateral economic
institutions can also promote liberalization. While our
results do not directly speak to the ability of other
international institutions to promote economic reform,
the combination of legally binding provisions, a part-
nership with a major power, and the flexibility of
negotiation timing that bilateralism affords seems an
effective recipe for economic reform. We expect those
economic international institutions that meet the above
conditions to be particularly effective. Potential candi-
dates include investment treaties, regulatory agree-
ments, and energy cooperation.
The policy implications are notable. In recent
years, domestic pressures to democratize have
intensified in the strategically important Middle East.
In Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, precarious democratic
transitions are currently underway. Our findings sug-
gests that intensifying trade cooperation with recently
democratized countries can promote liberalization and
help insecure leaders implement economic reforms.
We recommend that the EU and the United States
keep their door open for democratizing countries
interested in deeper trade cooperation and leverage
the trade negotiations to promote a wide variety of
economic reforms. From this perspective, the U.S.
decision to initiate trade negotiations with Tunisia’s
democratic government in October 2011 is welcome
news. As Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for
Europe and the Middle East put it, ‘‘The United States
strongly supports Tunisia’s transition to democracy
and to an open economic system governed by the rule
of law . . . enhancing U.S. trade and investment
integration with Tunisia to increase economic growth
and jobs is an important part of the support we can
give to this process.’’3 However, it is important to
recall that the democratizing country’s leader must
initiate the negotiations. Our evidence does not sug-
gest that the EU and the United States can successfully
force economic reform on recalcitrant negotiation
partners.
Domestic Politics, International
Institutions, and Economic Reform
National leaders are key strategic actors in interna-
tional politics. While leaders must decide on many
issues, few have drawn as much attention as eco-
nomic reform (Keefer 2007; Milner and Kubota 2005;
Vreeland 2003). To dismantle structures of redistribu-
tion and discrimination is one of the most controver-
sial policy choices available to a leader. After decades
of controversial reform efforts, political econo-
mists have debated why some leaders succeed in
reform while others fail (Geddes 1994; Przeworski
1991; Rodrik 1996). According to this literature,
a leader’s ability to compensate or suppress the
losers and mobilize the winners is the key to
successful reform (Brooks and Kurtz 2007; Haggard
and Webb 1994).
International institutions promote economic
reform in two ways. First, international institutions
allow credible policy commitments (Bu¨the and
Milner 2008; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006). If a
leader joins an international institution that increases
the cost of reneging on liberalization, the extent of
reform increases. Second, international institutions
allow leaders to compensate or coerce domestic
constituencies (Mattli and Plu¨mper 2004; Vreeland
2003). If a leader joins an international institution
that requires economic reform, the benefits of the
international institution are contingent on economic
reform. Those domestic constituencies that expect
benefits from the international institutions support
economic reform because failure to reform would
mean losing the benefits of international institution-
alization. However, there are few systematic empirical
analyses of these arguments. Most scholarship on
leaders focuses on cooperation or bargaining (Bueno
de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Dreher and Jensen 2009).
Scholarship on international institutions mostly
focuses on the IMF (Pop-Eleches 2009; Stone
2008), and these studies do not emphasize the
individual leader’s incentives. Perhaps the most
important exception is Vreeland (2003), who argues
that leaders use IMF programs to pass unpopular
policies.
3See ‘‘United States and Tunisia Re-Launch Bilateral Trade and
Investment Talks in Support of Tunisia’s Democratic Transition.’’
Available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/
2011/october/united-states-and-tunisia-re-launch-bilateral-trad
(accessed February 2, 2012).
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Although the PTA literature is burgeoning, few
studies reach beyond trade liberalization to examine
the general issue of economic reform. This is unfor-
tunate because PTAs can offer valuable insights into
the role of international institutions in economic reform.
Several economists have theorized about PTA effects
on economic reform (Ethier 1998; Fernandez and
Portes 1998), but these studies do not provide empir-
ical evidence. Some political scientists have noted that
PTAs can increase foreign direct investment (Bu¨the
and Milner 2008; Manger 2009), but these studies do
not theorize about the circumstances in which an
international institution is a necessary substitute for
domestic policy reform. Other political scientists
argue that the United States has used PTAs to force
developing countries to implement economic reforms
(Shadlen 2008), but the evidence provided for this
claim is limited to one multilateral agreement.
Theory
Our theory focuses on an individual leader’s decision
to form an international institution with a major
power, namely the EU or the United States. We expect
the leader to pursue international institutionalization
when two conditions are met:
1) The leader wants economic reform.
2) The leader faces domestic political opposition
to reform, but the international institution can
help overcome this opposition.
If these conditions are met, the leader prefers eco-
nomic reform but cannot implement it through
domestic political channels. By forming an interna-
tional institution, the leader can implement more
ambitious reforms than otherwise. When at least
one of the two conditions fails, we expect different
outcomes. If the leader does not want economic
reform, then policy change should not occur. If the
leader wants economic reform but faces little political
opposition, domestic implementation is possible with-
out international institutions.
We operationalize the leader’s demand for eco-
nomic reform by recent democratization, because
success in electoral competition depends on providing
public goods to mass constituencies. We operationalize
the leader’s domestic implementation difficulties by
recent leader change, because a new leader’s position is
weaker and more precarious than an established
leader’s. Empirically, the combination of democratiza-
tion and leader change should promote PTA negotia-
tions between the EU and the United States and
developing countries. Without democratization, the
effect of leader change on the probability of PTA
negotiations should be smaller. If democratization
occurs without leader change, the extent of economic
reform may increase somewhat, but the probability of
PTA negotiations need not increase.
Democratization and Leader’s Demand
for Economic Reform
By democratization, we refer to the recent enactment
of political institutions that induce competition
for office (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010).
Empirically, a country is said to be democratizing if
it has introduced competitive elections within the
last five years. We define economic reform as policies
that liberalize profitable activities in various sectors of
the national economy. Not limited to trade reform, this
definition captures many reforms in services, finance,
and investment.
Recent democratization increases a leader’s
demand for economic reform. In electoral competition,
leaders must supply public goods to mass constituen-
cies. Democratization creates incentives to implement
economic reforms that generate economic growth and
increase the supply of public goods, despite the fact that
vested distributional interests incur a cost (Milner and
Kubota 2005; Poast and Urpelainen 2013). By contrast,
since autocratic rulers need only satisfy the needs of
narrow elite constituencies, they have few incentives to
implement politically risky economic reforms that may
hurt influential domestic interests (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003).
New Leaders and the Difficulty of
Economic Reform
Even if a leader wants to reform, she may fail to do
so. Since newly democratized states are susceptible to
clientelism, their ability to commit to policy is limited
(Keefer 2007). Beneficiaries of state intervention
continue to oppose economic reforms, and liberaliza-
tion may become entrapped in a ‘‘partial reform
equilibrium’’ that benefits elites at the expense of the
public (Hellman 1998). Weak leaders often find
themselves in an impossible situation. They need eco-
nomic reforms to survive politically, but they cannot
implement these economic reforms because of political
opposition.
Implementing economic reforms is particular
difficult for new leaders. By a new leader, we refer
to a leader who has been recently elected in office and
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faces an uncertain political future.4 By an established
leader, we refer to a leader who has held power for
a long time. Vested interests have strong incentives to
oppose economic reforms, and new leaders cannot
easily override them because their own ruling coalition
is not stable (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).5
New leaders also suffer from commitment prob-
lems. Given that established leaders are not in immediate
danger of losing power, their long-time horizons allow
credible intertemporal exchanges and promises. By con-
trast, new leadershaveyet to consolidate their rule, so their
credibility is limited. Lack of credibility is harmful because
economic reforms cannot reassure investors unless the
government is able to credibly commit to them in the long
run (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006).
Even if economic reform is popular among
citizens, a new leader’s difficulties will not disappear.
Although the median voter prefers economic reform,
vested interests may block the reform. Previously
protected elites prefer to undermine democratic con-
solidation, a process characterized by a political strug-
gle between those who expect to gain from it and those
who expect to lose (Haggard and Kaufman 1995;
Hellman 1998; Przeworski 1991). Thus, even if popular
demand for economic reform increases, the leader’s
ability to supply the policy response is limited by oppo-
sition from vested interests who expect to lose upon
liberalization. They may try to influence political veto
players to stall reform policy, and they may try to
undermine implementation by bureaucratic agencies.
Here, we assume the process of political liberaliza-
tion that causes democratization is not sufficient to
deprive vested interests, which generally prefer previous
policies of state intervention, of all their political power.
Electoral accountability in young democracies is often
imperfect, exhibiting patterns of clientelism and patron-
age (Keefer 2007). The democratic government must not
only win elections but also avoid authoritarian reversals
(Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Przeworski 1991). The
vested interests that benefited from authoritarian rule
can use their resources and connections to undermine
reforms that hurt them the most. Indeed, empirical
evidence from case studies suggest that, even as the
public’s support is necessary for democratic consolida-
tion (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), democratizing
countries often revert to authoritarian rule due to a lack
of elite support (Geddes 1994).
While a new leader may also temporarily benefit
from a ‘‘honeymoon’’ period with the general public
(Haggard and Kaufman 1997), the relevance of the
honeymoon for successful economic reform is limited.
First, while honeymoon periods increase a leader’s
popular appeal, they do not change the balance of
power among organized interest groups. If a leader
worries about a coup or losing the support of orga-
nized interests in the long term, a temporary honey-
moon is not helpful. Second, the temporary nature of
honeymoon periods undermines the leader’s credible
commitment to liberalization. Even if a leader were
able to implement liberalization during the honey-
moon period, investors would not believe these
favorable political conditions to last for long. And
when the short honeymoon is over, the harsh reality
of domestic political opposition to liberalization is
again there. Anticipating potential implementation
problems, investors fail to respond to the incentives
that liberalization was supposed to create, and so the
leader’s gains from temporary liberalization during
the honeymoon period would be limited.
Preferential Trading Agreements and
Economic Reform
So far, we have argued that a new leader undergoing
democratization needs reform but cannot easily im-
plement it. We now explain how successful PTA
negotiations with a major power help. First, they
allow a credible commitment to reforms. Second,
the promise of market access can help the leader to
compensate influential domestic opponents for their
losses. We focus on major powers, specifically the EU
and the United States, because these two giants
include a wide range of reform provisions in their
agreements: from financial and service liberalization to
to privatization and improved regulations for foreign
direct investment (Du¨r et al. forthcoming; Horn,
Mavroidis, and Sapir 2009; World Bank 2005). Thus,
a PTA with the EU and the United States is an ideal
policy instrument for facilitating economic reform.6
4We focus on new leaders instead of, say, a leader’s probability of
losing power because our theory captures multiple impediments
to economic reform. Only some relate to the probability of losing
power.
5Somenew leadersmay be consolidatedwhile some established leaders
may face stiff political competition. All else constant, new leaders are in
greater danger of losing office, as shown in the appendix.
6An EU/U.S. PTA is not the only policy instrument that allows
a leader to promote economic reform. In particular, focal
multilateral institutions and organizations, such as the WTO
and the IMF, also promote liberal policies. Poast and Urpelainen
(2013) find that democratizing states often form their own
organizations to enhance the supply of public goods. While our
focus is on PTAs, the empirical analysis of economic reform also
accounts for the potential effects of WTO membership and
participation in IMF programs.
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We assume both the EU and the United States
and developing countries have a say in negotiations.
Since the EU and the United States have global eco-
nomic interests, they have an interest in negotiating
bilateral treaties on economic reform with a rather
large number of developing countries. However, we
also assume the EU and the United States cannot
easily coerce developing countries into forming PTAs.
Our theory does not require that the developing
country’s leader holds the initiative, but it does
require that the leader’s consent is, in most cases,
necessary for initiating the negotiations. As long as
the leader’s role in PTA negotiations is not insignif-
icant, an increase in the leader’s in PTA formation, so
as to promote economic reform, should play a role.
How can a PTA enable credible commitment to
reform? First, it explicitly codifies legally binding
rules (Bu¨the and Milner 2008; Ethier 1998; Mansfield,
Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). Failure to comply
with international law undermines a country’s repu-
tation, thus reducing future opportunities to cooper-
ate on related issues (Guzman 2008). If a developing
country reneges on a PTA, it not only sends a negative
signal to investors who prefer liberalization, but it also
shows that it is ready to disregard international law to
pursue its interests. Second, a PTA often contains
enforcement mechanisms, such as a dispute-settlement
procedure that can issue legal rulings on trade and other
policies (Kono 2007). These enforcement mechanisms
mean that the PTA partner whose rights have been
violated can legitimately impose sanctions on a defector.
This reduces the PTA partner’s cost of imposing these
sanctions and thus increases the cost of defection in the
first place. Finally, in the case of the EU and the United
States, the developing country is negotiating with
a major power that can effectively retaliate policy
violations. For example, if a developing country
fails to liberalize according to PTA provisions, the
EU and the United States can retaliate by withdraw-
ing trade concessions.
For these reasons, a PTA should reduce a developing
country’s incentive to renege on previous commitments
to economic reform. A commitment enshrined in a
PTA is more credible than a purely domestic commit-
ment, both because the PTA facilitates international
enforcement and because the reputational loss from
violating international law is greater than the loss from
dismantling domestic legislation.
Already during the negotiations, the promise of
a PTA with provisions for access to large markets in
advanced industrialized countries can create incen-
tives to implement economic reforms. This is so for
three reasons. First, if the leader promises that the
reforms will create market access to the EU and the
United States, she pays a reputational cost for failing
to fulfill this promise. Second, since the leader and the
domestic groups supporting liberalization understand
that the reforms are not credible without the enforce-
ment powers afforded by the PTA, it is in their own
interest to finish the negotiations. Finally, to the extent
that the main obstacle to a treaty is EU/U.S. concern
about the developing country’s credibility, some prior
action may be necessary to seal the deal.7
The institutional design of EU/U.S. PTAs illus-
trates. We coded the design provisions of PTAs in our
dataset on FDI liberalization. Based on a sample of
41 agreements, an EU/U.S. PTA has on average 6.9
FDI liberalization provisions. Moreover, practitioners
emphasize the importance of credible commitment.
For example, the International Trade Administration
of the U.S. Department of Commerce emphasizes
that ‘‘Trade agreements are also a tool for promoting
fair competition and encouraging foreign governments
to adopt open and transparent rulemaking procedures
as well as non-discriminatory laws and regulations.’’8
The second reason why a new leader can promote
reforms through a PTA with a major power is the
promise of market access. By beginning negotiations,
the leader can offer foreign market access to influential
domestic constituencies who expect to lose from eco-
nomic reforms. Although these domestic constituen-
cies may lose from the economic reforms, they also
accept the reforms if the value of the foreign market
access that they acquire in exchange is high enough.
Such domestic-issue linkage explains why even a weak
leader can engage in PTA negotiations: by raising the
possibility of PTA negotiations, the weak leader can
create a domestic constituency who supports the PTA.
If the PTA is contingent on economic reform, this
new domestic constituency will also support eco-
nomic reform.9 As Pastor and Wise put it, ‘‘the set of
potential supporters can widen as various interest
7The vast majority of PTA negotiations succeed, and the
negotiation time in most cases is only one to two years.
Moreover, domestic interest groups can observe developments
in negotiations to avoid promoting reforms that will not be
accompanied by a PTA in the future. Empirically, then, domestic
interests have good reasons to believe successful reforms will be
followed by a PTA.
8‘‘U.S. Free Trade Agreements.’’ http://www.export.gov/FTA
(accessed February 23, 2010).
9Notably, the leader need not use the PTA to buy off vested
interests from the autocratic era. Instead, the leader could use the
PTA to expand her support coalition among constituencies
empowered by democratization. Even as opposition from vested
interests would remain stiff, the power of the winner coalition
would also increase.
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groups accept the costs from one government action
in order to obtain the benefits of another part of the
policy package’’ (1994, 475). Additionally, interna-
tional negotiations are in most developing countries
the executive’s privilege, so initiating them may be
easier than passing domestic legislation.
The benefits of credible commitment and domestic
side payments require that the major power prefer
economic reform in the partner country. The EU and
the United States expect net benefits from PTAs
because the policy commitments enshrined in these
treaties create profitable opportunities for major
corporations, especially with regard to services and
investment. By forming PTAs, the EU and the United
States can pry open markets and create investment
opportunities for major corporations in developing
countries (Heron and Siles-Bru¨gge 2012; Shadlen
2005). Moreover, the competitive nature of PTA for-
mation may result in defensive PTA formation, whereby
the EU and the United States forms a bilateral trade
treaty to offset the competitive advantages that
corporations from other countries have formed
through PTAs (Manger 2009). PTAs generally in-
crease FDI inflows to countries that are potential
FDI recipients (Bu¨the and Milner 2008). PTAs
enable a credible commitment to liberal policies,
protecting IPRs, and liberalizing services.
In sum, PTAs can be thought of as removing
obstacles to profitable investments in developing
countries. Both the EU and the United States have
a high number of major corporations that are in a
position to invest in newly liberalized markets, and
these major corporations lobby for PTAs that allow
developing countries to implement economic reforms
that are otherwise unfeasible. More broadly, the EU
and the United States may also expect political benefits
from supporting new leaders during democratic tran-
sitions, so as to avoid autocratic reversals. They are not
only willing but also able to enforce PTAs. Their large
domestic markets are valuable to their partners.
Moreover, failure to enforce a PTA would under-
mine their credibility in the future. Such credibility
is important for the EU and the United States given
their global political and economic interests.10
Empirical Implications
To test our theory, we examine two falsifiable hypoth-
eses. First, we have argued that new leaders in recently
democratized countries engage in PTA negotiations
because they need reform but cannot implement it
without external assistance.
H1: Following recent democratization, leader change
increases the probability that a developing country
engages in PTA negotiations with the EU and the
United States.
This hypothesis is the cornerstone of our theory.
If there is no interactive effect of leader change and
democratization on the probability that a developing
country engages in PTA negotiations with the EU or
the United States, the other hypothesis that we will
present loses importance.
Our second hypothesis is that PTA negotiations
prompt economic reform in the developing country.
While there are many reasons why leaders may engage
in PTA negotiations, credible international commit-
ments on economic reform should be important, if our
theory is valid. Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect
that PTA negotiations induced by leader change under
democratization are particularly adept at promoting
economic reform. Our theory posits that democratiza-
tion creates demand for economic reform, while leader
change means that policy change is difficult without an
international treaty, so the PTA should cause a sharp
break from past policies.
H2A: EU/U.S. PTA negotiations and signature increase
economic reform in developing countries.
H2B: The positive effect of EU/U.S. PTA negotiations
and signature on economic reform should be particularly
likely for new leaders under democratization.
We consider both negotiation and signature because
there are good reasons to expect anticipatory effects.11
If the EU and the United States worry about the cred-
ibility of reform plans in developing countries, they
may demand policy change already during negotiations.
For a leader interested in reform, this is obviously high
desirable. Moreover, the domestic constituencies that
expect benefits from an EU/U.S. PTA have strong
incentives to demand such reforms, so as to seal the
PTA deal.
10The EU and the United States may also be interested in specific
strategic benefits, such as supporting a strategically important ally
in the Middle East (Ludema 2007). This may explain why the EU
and the United States would sometimes, if not often, promote
PTA formation even with seemingly unimportant national
economies. However, in such cases, the PTA’s ability to promote
economic reform may be limited.
11We refer to ‘‘signature’’ instead of ‘‘ratification’’ because,
following Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2002), this is
how we operationalize treaty formation. In practice, the distinc-
tion is meaningless because the mean time from signature to
ratification is approximately one year, and no EU/U.S. PTA has
ever failed due to a lack of ratification.
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Case Study: South Africa
To illustrate our theory, we discuss the relationship
between South Africa’s postapartheid reforms and
the country’s Trade, Development and Co-operation
Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. Our quantitative
model below predicts an EU-South Africa PTA
particlarly well, so the case is useful for illustrating
our theory (Lieberman 2005; Seawright and Gerring
2008). It features a prominent leader change, namely
Nelson Mandela’s becoming the country’s President,
at the time of democratization as the black majority
gained suffrage. Moreover, the developing country in
focus is an important economy with a previous history
of extensive state intervention (Hirsch 2005), so the
scope conditions of our theory are clearly met: eco-
nomic reform is possible, and the EU has a clear interest
in investment and export market access. Given these
features, the case study is a ‘‘most likely’’ one.
The PTA negotiations began in 1994 and were
concluded in 1999, with the PTA entering into force
on May 1, 2004. Based on evidence from elite inter-
views and other material, we show that South Africa’s
new President, Nelson Mandela, who faced political
opposition to reform and suffered from a lack of
credibility as a liberalizer, used the PTA negotiations
to promote badly needed economic reform during a
difficult democratization process. In the next section,
we conduct a more general statistical test of this
argument.
Demand for Reform
According to our theory, developing countries should
engage in PTA negotiations with major powers if
democratization creates demand for reform but a new
leader’s lack of political clout and credibility impede
liberalization. In South Africa, democratization’s effect
on demand for economic reform could not have been
larger. In April 1994, the African National Congress
(ANC) won a landslide victory, receiving almost
two-thirds of all votes. During apartheid, the heavily
regulated South African economy had been geared
toward meeting the white minority’s needs. Per capita
income among whites was almost 10 times as high as
among blacks, and the performance of the South
African economy during the last 10 years had been
dismal (Hirsch 2005, 2). For the ANC, democratiza-
tion thus presented a dilemma: ‘‘was there a way in
which growth and redistribution in South Africa could
complement each other’’ (Hirsch 2005, 1)?
For Mandela’s government, economic reform was
needed for a successful combination of redistribution
and growth. During the apartheid era, South Africa
had been largely isolated from the world economy due
to international sanctions. South Africa’s trade and
other economic policies were designed to maximize
the white minority’s welfare under de facto autarky.
Following democratization, Mandela’s government
sought to maximize the black majority’s welfare in
an open world economy. This goal required trade
liberalization, enhanced foreign direct investment, pri-
vatization, and extensive redistribution of wealth.
According to Ismail Faizel, one of South Africa’s lead
negotiators in talks on the EU PTA, ‘‘Mandela’s pres-
idency was focused on economic reform.’’12
Difficulty of Reform
Despite the urgent need for reform, Mandela’s young
and inexperienced government faced numerous
obstacles to liberalization. While the ANC itself
supported reform, two other influential political
players, namely the Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African
Communist Party (SACP), were opposed to liber-
alization.13 At the time, some commentators
believed the government’s promise to reform while
others questioned it.
Why would COSATU and SACP not oppose
a PTA with the EU if they were against economic
reform? First, both COSATU and SACP opposed
privatization and foreign investment more than they
opposed tariff reductions. As Habib and Padayachee
explain, ‘‘[g]rassroots activists within the ANC,
the SACP and COSATU continued to advocate
a radicaleconomic program that included nation-
alization . . . and controls over foreign investors’’
(2000, 249). More specifically, there were two
constituencies with different economic strategies:
(1) the business community and the white population
emphasized economic growth, minimal state interven-
tion, privatization, and deregulation; (2) the poorest
part of the black population advocated the expansion
of the public sector, state intervention, and radical
redistribution policies (Habib and Padayachee 2000,
250). According to Pillay, the stance against privatiza-
tion was a strict ideological position of trade unions
12Mr. Ismail is an U.S. Ambassador Permanent Representative of
South Africa to the WTO. Interview by the authors with Ismail
Faizel on February 6, 2012.
13Interview by the authors with Morgenie Pillay, deputy director
of International Trade in Services for the Department of Trade
and Industry, on February 27, 2012. Ms. Pillay’s views do not
necessarily represent the views of the Department of Trade and
Industry.
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that advocated nationalization as instrument to redis-
tribute resources to the black majority.14
Conversely, Alan Hirsch argues that ‘‘all parties
of the majority, i.e., mainly black parties, favored
trade reform during the transition to democracy.’’15
As a result, ‘‘South Africa developed a genuine and far
reaching multilateral trade reform agenda in the early
1990s, and stuck to it through the 1990s and 2000s.’’
That is also confirmed by Wilhelm Smalberger, a lead
economist in the Department of Trade and Industry.16
Furthermore, Pillay notes that trade liberalization was
not the main focus of trade unions’ political agenda
that were especially concerned about resource redistrib-
ution and nation building.17 Indeed,the tariff reductions
were more favorable for South African than for
European products. For instance, Kalaba, Sandrey,
and van Seventer show that the EU liberalized ‘‘at a
faster pace (three years compared the 12 for South
Africa) and with a broader coverage (95% of all imports
versus the 86% for South Africa)’’ (2005, 25). Such a
smooth tariff schedule allowed import-competing in-
dustries to gradually adjust to liberalization. This helps
explain why the opposition to a PTA was lower than the
opposition to privatization and foreign investment.
Opposition to reform was not the only problem
that the newly elected Mandela’s government faced.
There was also a credibility issue. Specifically, interna-
tional investors did not believe Mandela’s promises of
liberalization were credible. President Mandela himself
justified the renewed appointment of apartheid-era
technocrats in his administration by noting that
‘‘the boys from the stock exchange and elsewhere
seem to be very jittery.’’18 Moreover, as we interviewed
Ismail Faizel, he offered the following description:
‘‘we were young and inexperienced leaders who had
spent the previous years hidden in the bush . . . the
skepticism from the market was understandable.’’
Lacking experience and credibility in a difficult political
environment, Mandela’s government sought external
assistance for reform.
The lack of credibility is emphasized by Alan
Hirsch as well. He argues that ‘‘the ANC did not have
a clear economic policy or a track record of governing,
and because most of its supporters had suffered
economically under Apartheid, there was a credibility
issue.’’19 In the same interview, Hirsch claims that
‘‘there was a real fear of South Africa losing its
sovereignty to the IMF or global banks.’’ Pillay argues
that ‘‘there was uncertainty regulations and economic
policies implemented by the newly elected government.
There were concerns about nationalization and high
taxation on capital owned especially by the white
minority. In this respect, the PTA with the EU was a
signaling instrument to reassure intentional markets
that South Africa was serious about liberalizing and
protecting investment.’’20
Preferential Trading Agreement and
Economic Reform
The negotiations with the EU were difficult. In par-
ticular, the parties disagreed on agricultural liberaliza-
tion, with South Africa demanding more liberalization
than the EU was willing to offer. However, the available
evidence also suggests that, from the very beginning, the
South African government used the PTA negotiations
to build political support for, and enhance the
credibility of, economic reform. When interviewed,
Morgenie Pillay noted that ‘‘the government used the
WTO and the PTA with the EU to tie its hands and to
sell reforms to political constituencies that were not
happy about economic liberalization.’’ Academic
research supports this view: ‘‘the trade negotiations
with the EU were integrated into a more comprehen-
sive trade policy reform process . . . This explicit link
between trade negotiations and overall development
policy played a determinant role in the coherence of
the South African approach’’ (Bilal and Laporte
2004, 14).
South Africa implemented important economic
reforms during the negotiation period and soon after
its signature. Importantly, these reforms are tightly
linked to the agreement’s provisions. For instance,
South Africa took serious step to encourage and entice
foreign direct investment. Habib and Padayachee
note that ‘‘twin objectives of restoring business
confidence and attracting foreign investment seemed
to swamp all other considerations’’ (2000, 249).
Moreover, in mid 1990s Thabo Mbeki, then
Deputy-President, ‘‘announced plans for privatiza-
tion initiatives that included parts of parastatals like
14Interview by the authors on July 19, 2012.
15Dr. Hirsch is a Professor and Director of Aradual School of
development Policy and Practice of the University of Cape town.
He is a leading academic expert on South Africa’s trade relations.
Interview by the authors on February 14, 2012.
16Interview by the authors on February 13, 2012. Smalberger’s
views are personal and do not necessarily represent the views of
the Department of Trade and Industry.
17Interview by the authors on July 19, 2012.
18Cape Times on July 6, 1994.
19Interview by the authors on February 14, 2012.
20Interview by the authors on July 19, 2012.
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Telkom and South Africa Airways’’ (Habib and
Padayachee 2000, 252). More generally, South Africa
championed liberal reform in general, and trade
liberalization in particular, during the 1990s. This is
so true that Manuel Trevor, then Minister of Trade
and Industry, was often accused by trade union
leaders to be ‘‘holier than GATT’’ when it comes to
tariff reductions (Habib and Padayachee 2000, 252).
The EU PTA prescribed particularly demanding
changes in competition policy, which was important
for South Africa’s ambitious privatization plans.
Section D contains provisions on competition policy.
Article 35 states that restriction of competition and
abuses of market dominance affecting trade between
the EU and South Africa are not compatible with the
PTA. Article 36 stipulates that the parties have to
implement the necessary laws and regulations to
comply with the competition provisions within a
period of three years from the entry into force of the
PTA. Articles 41–43 deal with public aid. Specifically,
article 41(1) states that public aid favoring certain
companies or the production of certain goods, which
distorts or threaten to distort competition, is not
compatible with the PTA.
Competition provisions have also tied South
Africa’s hands over time. For instance, ‘‘in at least
one case, the EU has vetoed a merger approved by the
South African Authorities’’ (Holmes et al. 2005, 106).
While EU intervention in foreign mergers is not new,
the EU-South Africa trade agreement went further
than that. It fostered informal cooperation between
the EU and South Africa on anticompetitive activities
(Chetty 2005). As Faizel puts it in the aforementioned
interview, ‘‘we learnt a lot from the EU in terms of
competition policy.’’
There is also evidence of side payments to
domestic constituencies. For instance, in article 40,
the EU provides technical assistance to help South
Africa comply with the competition policy provisions.
The associated reforms were so successful that a 2003
peer review by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) praised South
Africa for exceptional performance in competition
policy reform (OECD 2003).21
Finally, South Africa’s compliance with the EU
PTA is noteworthy. While the EU PTA provides
for legally binding dispute resolution and sanctions,
the EU never saw any need to apply these enforcement
mechanisms. According to the interview with
Dr. Smalberger, the EU had not filed a single complaint
about implementation at the time of the interview.
Remarkably, the EU PTA allowed South Africa to
implement political controversial economic reforms
with relative ease.
Democratization, New Leaders, and
Preferential Trading Agreements:
Research Design
Is South Africa’s experience unique, or does this same
logic apply to EU/U.S. PTAs more generally? We present
our empirical evidence, which shows that South Africa’s
experience generalizes, in two parts. The first part
examines the interactive effect of democratization and
leader change on PTA negotiations. The second part
investigates whether EU/U.S. PTAs induce economic
reform in developing countries.
Recall our primary hypotheses: leader change
under democratization has a strong positive effect
on PTA negotiations and economic reform. While
democratization without leader change may increase
reform incentives (see our supplementary appendix
for evidence), we do not expect it to increase the
probability of PTA negotiations. Leader change may
cause policy change simply because a new leader has
different preferences than the previous one; beyond
this novelty effect, we do not expect leader change to
have large effects on PTA negotiations or reform.
The unit of analysis is the undirected dyad-year.
Each dyad-year comprises a developing country i and
a major power j, which is either the EU or the United
States. We classify a country as developing if it is
included in the category Upper Middle Income, Lower
Middle Income, or Low Income by the World Bank.
With 140 developing countries included, most of the
missing countries are tiny economies, such as island
states. Given that PTAs began to proliferate in the
aftermath of the Cold War, and PTAs formed prior to
1990 were shallow agreements, we focus on the years
1990–2007. The dataset is unbalanced since some
countries, such as those from the former Soviet Union,
enter the dataset only after 1990. In total, we have
4,460 observations.
We estimate the probability that a developing
country engages in EU/US PTA negotiations at a
given time. Technically, we estimate a proportional
hazards model of the form hij;t ¼ h0 ij; tð Þexp bX½ ,
where
21The EU PTA also prescribed extensive reform of intellectual
property rights, but our interviews suggest that this demand was
imposed by the EU and opposed by the South African
government.
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bX ¼ b0 þ b1LeaderChangei;t þ b2Democratizationi;t
þ beta3LeaderChangei;tDemocratizationi;t
þ b4Controlsi;t
þ b5Controlsij;t þ hi þ eij;t :
ð1Þ
In this equation, hi,jt is the hazard rate for the
initiation of PTA negotiations between developing
country i and major power j. Similarly, h0 (ij,t is the
baseline hazard. Year is denoted by t. Leader change
and democratization in country i, as well as their
joint occurrence, are the main explanatory variables.
The model will also include a battery of control
variables, some specific to developing country i and
some to the undirected dyad ij. Finally, each bk is a
coefficient, bi denotes region fixed effects, and eij,t is
the error term. In the main text, we report results from
a standard regression analysis. While we recognize the
fact that PTA negotiations are not randomly distributed,
we do not use matching for the main analysis because
data would be lost. However, the supplementary
appendix shows that the results are robust to matching.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable, ln(tij), is the logarithmized
time in years t that country i ‘survives’ without
initiating PTA negotiations with major power j.
To code the beginning of PTA negotiations, we use
the official starting year. Although countries hold
informal talks before the actual bargaining begins,
this information is difficult to collect and verify for
accuracy. To guard against bias from inaccurate
measurement, we implemented multiple robustness
checks, as discussed in the results section. The data
are original and described in the supplementary
appendix.
Recall that our theory focuses only on EU/U.S.
PTAs.22 First, beyond tariff reductions, the EU and
the United States are concerned with key economic
reforms such as financial liberalization and IPR
protection. Second, the EU and the United States are
major powers capable of enforcing PTA provisions.
No developing country has signed more than one
PTA with the EU and the United States, respectively,
over the period of investigation. Thus, a dyad drops
from our dataset immediately after the first negotiation
round begins. Our model explains 71 negotiation onsets
during the period under investigation. We include both
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, such as the
EU-Gulf Cooperation Council and the U.S.-Central
American Free Trade Agreement. Since observations
are not independent in the case of multilateral nego-
tiations, we also estimate the model without any
multilateral agreements. In this case, the number of
negotiation onsets decreases to 46. Next, we estimate
a model excluding ongoing negotiations that have so far
failed to produce a PTA. This allows us to verify that
our findings are not driven by contentious negotiations.
Finally, we estimate the model excluding all stable
democracies from the dataset because they cannot
democratize. A democracy is said to be stable if it has
been continuously democratic for 10 years. By using
such a lax criterion for democratic stability, we stack the
deck against our theoretical argument.
Explanatory Variables
The relative rarity of PTA negotiations presents
a challenge. Given that the dependent variable rarely
obtains a positive value, the coding of explanatory
variables requires particular care. The problem is
compounded by the fact that both democratization
and leader change are, ultimately, qualitative phe-
nomena that cannot be coded in a purely objective
fashion. To ensure that our results are not driven by
qualitative coding decisions, we present results from
a wide variety of alternative coding schemes.
Our data on leader change are from the Archigos
dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).
This variable scores 1 if a new prime minister is elected
in a parliamentary democracy; a new president is inau-
gurated in a presidential democracy; or a new dictator
seizes power in an autocratic country. We have data on
leader change by date, so the measurement is highly
accurate. We code leader change in a conservative
fashion. In year t, the binary variable obtains a positive
value only if there were a leader change in that year.
In alternative specifications, we also verify that our
results continue to hold if we include leader changes at
t ‒ 1 or t ‒ 2.
For democratization, we use the relatively stringent
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) coding that
distinguishes between autocracies and democracies.
Democratization occurs in year t if the country allowed
competitive elections between years t ‒ 5 and t.23
As alternate measures, we use a positive change of
22Japan is another country to consider. It is, however, a much
smaller economy than the EU the United States. Additionally,
Japan’s PTAs are very recent and regional.
23For a similar operationalization of democratization, see Gle-
ditsch and Ward (2000).
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at least 3 points in a country’s Polity IV score and a
change of more than 1 point in the Freedom House
measure of democracy (combined political and civil
rights).24 For robustness, we also used three-year and
seven-year intervals for each measure.
To facilitate the presentation of the results, we use
the following transformations. LeaderChange scores 1
if there was a leader change but no democratization,
and 0 otherwise. Democratization scores 1 if there was
a democratization but no leader change, and 0 other-
wise. LeaderChange* Democratization scores 1 if there
was a leader change under democratization, and 0
otherwise. This formulation is mathematically equiv-
alent to a standard interaction model with constituent
terms, but it yields correct standard errors in the
results table.25
Some developing countries were not independent
states during the Cold War, so we could not calculate
the variables Democratization and LeaderChange *
Democratization for them. To avoid losing PTA
negotiations in the early 1990s, we filled in the missing
values for the 1980s as follows. First, we use the
democracy score of the Soviet Union for countries
that were previously members. Second, we use the
democracy score of Yugoslavia for Bosnia, Croatia,
Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia. Finally, we use the
democracy score of Ethiopia for Eritrea. As a robust-
ness test, we ensured that this coding decision does not
drive our results by allowing the missing data to
disappear from our dataset.
Control Variables
In some of our models, we add control variables
based on Baier and Bergstrand’s (2004) model of PTA
formation. First, we add GDP per capita to capture
the income level of a developing country. Second, we
measure economic growth in a developing country.
Third, we add total GDP to measure the economic
importance of a developing country.26 Fourth, we use
the logarithmized value of exports plus imports in
constant U.S. dollars from developing country i to
the EU or the United States, depending on the dyad,
in year t‒1 for trade flows. Since a PTA is nominally a
trade agreement, we use this common proxy for trade
relations. The data for these four variables are from the
IMF.
We include several political variables in the
baseline model. Most of these variables are lagged
by one year to avoid endogeneity problems. First, the
alliance variable scores 1 if a developing country is an
ally of the United States in year t‒1 and 0 otherwise.
As Gowa (1994) shows, military alliances are positively
associated with good trading relations. These data are
from the Correlates of War. Second, democracy is a
dummy variable that scores 1 if a developing country
i is a democracy at time t‒1, as measured in Cheibub,
Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Previous research has
shown that democratic pairs of countries sign PTAs
more frequently than autocratic or mixed pairs
(Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002). Third,
tenure measures the number of years that the pre-
vious leader was in office. We obtain it from the
Database of Political Institutions (Keefer 2007). This
measure allows us to separate the effect of leader
turnover from past uncertainty regarding executive
tenure. Fourth, we include distance as another
control of the importance of a developing country.
The data are from the 2005 CEPII dataset. Finally,
we add the number of PTAs negotiated by countries
other than country i with the EU and the United
States in the same geographic region by time t. This
captures the possibility that country i reacts to other
agreements negotiated with the EU or the United
States (Manger 2009). We label this variable ‘‘diffusion.’’
Descriptive statistics are provided in the supplementary
appendix.
We include an expanded model with several other
variables capturing domestic institutions and interna-
tional factors. For data on executive constraints, we
rely on the Polity IV database. Moreover, we include a
political stability variable from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators to account for the possibil-
ity that major powers avoid risky partnerships.
Furthermore, we estimate the model with a dummy
variable for participation in an IMF program
(Vreeland 2007) and a count variable for World Bank
programs (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). These
programs are relevant because they could induce
developing countries to implement economic reforms
(Vreeland 2003). Finally, we include the natural
logarithm of bilateral aid from the EU and the United
States to developing countries, so as to account for
24For Polity IV, we deal with interregnum years following
Plu¨mper and Neumayer (2010, 214–18).
25The tetrachoric correlation between leader change and de-
mocratization is 0.22 (standard error is 0.04). There are countries
that democratized without leader change. For instance, Jerry John
Rawlings ruled Ghana as a military dictator in 1979 and from
1981 to 1992, and then he became the first elected president of
the Fourth Republic in 1993, keeping his office until 2001.
26We use GDP instead of population, another widely used
indicator of economic importance, because the former measure
is available for a larger number of number of countries than the
latter measure. However, since GDP appears three times on the
right-hand side of our equation, we also replaced it with
population as a robustness test.
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developing countries’ salience as recipients. These data
are also from the WDI.27
Model Specification
We estimate a Cox proportional hazards model, and
the supplementary appendix presents a variety of
parametric models. Survival analysis is appropriate
because we are dealing with right-censored data. The
Schoenfeld residuals test indicates that the propor-
tionality assumption holds. We base our significance
tests on Huber (robust) standard errors. These standard
errors can account for possible heteroskedasticity, serial
correlation, and intragroup correlation. To control for
heterogeneity among regions, we include dummy
variables following a 2003 World Bank classification
for eight regions.28
Democratization and
New Leaders: Results
The empirical analysis supports our theoretical argu-
ment. We find that for all seven models, leader change
has a substantively large effect on the probability of
PTA negotiations if a developing country has recently
democratized. This effect is statistically distinguishable
from zero and clearly dominates the effect of standard
control variables, such as income levels and distance.
The hazard ratios are reported in Table 1. The
first column gives the full sample. The second and
third columns give the models excluding multilateral
agreements and stable democracies, respectively.
The fourth column excludes negotiations that have
yet to produce a PTA. The fifth and sixth columns
report the expanded models for the full sample.
As the table shows, the simultaneous occurrence of
leader change and democratization has a positive
effect on the hazard rate for PTA negotiations. This
effect is much larger than the effect of leader change
without democratization.29 Interestingly, democrati-
zation itself does not have an effect on PTA formation
in the absence of leader change. This observation
undermines the alternative explanation that the EU
and the United States use PTAs to simply reward
democratization.
The substantive effects of leader change without
democratization, democratization without leader
change, and both are illustrated in Figure 1. Since
marginal effects are difficult to interpet with the
Cox model due to the absence of a baseline hazard
(Kyyra¨ 2009), we rely on probit models to estimate the
marginal effects.30 Marginal effects for Democratization
capture the effect of democratization without leader
change, while marginal effects for Leader Change
capture the effect of leader change without democ-
ratization. Marginal effects for Both represent simul-
taneous leader change and democratization. We show
these effects for the baseline model and the four
different samples.31
The figure shows that leader change has a positive
effect on PTA negotiations, with or without democ-
ratization, but the expected effect is many times
higher under democratization. Consistent with our
theoretical argument, leader change explains PTA
negotiations under democratization. The substantive
effects are large, so it is safe to say that the combi-
nation of leader change and democratization is a central
explanatory variable for PTA negotiations with the EU
or the United States.
The control variables do not contain any major
surprises. Consistent with previous research, high
income levels and small distances are powerful pre-
dictors of PTA negotiations. By contrast, neither regime
type nor population seem to consistently predict the
initiation of PTA negotiations. Population and military
alliances also do not predict PTA negotiations.
Interestingly, political stability increases the probability
of PTA negotiations. This goes against the notion that
27We replace missing values with zero to avoid losing observa-
tions. The variable is not included in most of our models, so this
coding decision is not driving our results.
28Sub-Saharan Africa represents the omitted reference category in
the estimations. We cannot use dyad fixed effects because many
developing countries do not initiate PTA negotiations.
29The coefficients of leader change without democratization and
leader change with democratization are statistically distinguish-
able at the 0.05 level.
30Results of the probit models are found in the supplementary
appendix. We obtain similar results if we use flexible parametric
cox model (‘stpm2’ in Stata 12).
31In the supplementary appendix, we present a table of actual
cases. It shows that the models capture such salient cases as
United States-Mexico (1990), EU-South Africa (1995), EU-
Croatia (2000), and United States-Peru (2003). For the EU, our
relatively rare explanatory variables can explain 13 of the 26 cases.
For the United States, they explain considerably fewer, 2 of 13. As
to failed predictions, many of these countries are poor African
economies. They may have failed to utilize PTA negotiations for
economic reform because the EU and the United States were not
interested in engaging in talks with them. Taiwan cannot formally
negotiate international agreements, while Sri Lanka and Congo
have been in a civil war in recent years. Interestingly, our
matching analysis in the robustness section demonstrates that
many of these countries are removed if we balance such
covariates as GDP per capita between positive and negative
observations.
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TABLE 1 The Effect of Leader Change and Democratization on the Initiation of PTA Negotiations
SAMPLE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Bilateral No stable Not ongoing Full Full
Democratization, no leader change 1.06
(0.63)
1.66
(1.17)
1.01
(0.61)
1.89
(1.31)
1.07
(0.60)
2.20
(1.25)
Leader change, no democratization 2.22***
(0.66)
2.29**
(0.88)
2.45**
(0.97)
2.33**
(0.92)
1.84**
(0.56)
1.89*
(0.62)
Leader change and democratization 5.56***
(2.55)
6.81***
(3.65)
5.18***
(2.72)
8.09***
(4.83)
5.73***
(2.74)
7.54***
(4.37)
GDP per capita 1.05**
(0.02)
1.03
(0.03)
1.09***
(0.02)
1.04
(0.04)
1.08***
(0.03)
1.07**
(0.03)
Trade 1.02
(0.03)
0.96
(0.04)
1.00
(0.04)
0.95
(0.04)
1.01
(0.03)
0.99
(0.03)
Democracy 1.05
(0.39)
0.85
(0.43)
1.01
(0.45)
0.81
(0.45)
0.50
(0.22)
0.23***
(0.11)
Alliance 0.72
(0.22)
0.58
(0.21)
0.86
(0.34)
0.76
(0.29)
0.69
(0.22)
0.48**
(0.18)
Distance 0.35***
(0.08)
0.23***
(0.06)
0.30***
(0.08)
0.17***
(0.05)
0.30***
(0.07)
0.20***
(0.06)
GDP 1.41***
(0.12)
1.49***
(0.18)
1.39***
(0.18)
1.48***
(0.19)
1.32***
(0.13)
1.32**
(0.17)
GDP growth 1.00
(0.01)
1.00
(0.01)
0.99
(0.01)
1.00
(0.01)
0.99
(0.02)
1.00
(0.02)
Previous leader’s tenure 0.97*
(0.02)
0.97
(0.03)
0.98
(0.02)
0.96
(0.03)
0.98
(0.02)
0.99
(0.02)
PTA diffusion 1.08
(0.06)
1.03
(0.07)
1.13*
(0.08)
1.04
(0.07)
1.05
(0.05)
1.13
(0.08)
Executive constraints 1.47***
(0.17)
1.55***
(0.20)
Political stability 1.27
(0.21)
1.56
(0.33)
Foreign aid 1.01
(0.02)
IMF program 3.40***
(1.22)
World Bank programs 1.09
(0.07)
East Asia 1.69
(1.13)
5.69*
(5.34)
1.37
(1.13)
11.09*
(13.79)
1.65
(1.08)
3.22
(2.98)
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.87
(0.62)
2.14
(2.23)
0.38
(0.33)
2.58
(3.32)
0.59
(0.40)
0.37
(0.48)
Latin America 2.24
(1.40)
2.70
(2.64)
2.40
(1.67)
7.49*
(8.80)
2.32
(1.33)
2.92
(2.36)
Middle East and North Africa 2.52
(2.13)
6.42
(7.47)
1.40
(1.30)
12.07*
(17.06)
3.86
(3.40)
4.70
(6.58)
Western Europe 2.90
(2.42)
5.30
(5.62)
1.65
(1.36)
1.29
(1.03)
2.49
(2.05)
South Asia 0.64
(0.56)
1.90
(2.01)
0.74
(0.60)
Negotiation onsets 71 46 47 43 68 56
Observations 4458 4563 3466 4559 3818 3206
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p , 0.01; **p , 0.05; *p , 0.1.
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the EU and the United States use PTAs to stabilize
unstable countries for geopolitical reasons.32
Preferential Trading Agreements
and Economic Reforms
Leader change under democratization explains PTA
negotiations, but do PTAs induce economic reform?
In this section, we show that they do. First, we examine
the timing of structural breaks in reform data for
countries that negotiated or signed a PTA with the EU
or the United States. Second, we compare these results
with economic reforms in a selection of countries
that did not engage in PTA negotiations but are
comparable to those that did based on matched data.
We find that economic reform in such countries was
much less common. We also replicate these results
using a conventional differences-in-differences regres-
sion. The technical details of the estimation are found
in the supplementary appendix.
Structural Breaks
We analyze structural breaks because it is difficult to
examine the causal effect of PTA negotiations on
economic reform using standard regression techniques.
Major powers have incentives to negotiate a PTA with
developing countries that are willing to implement
economic reforms. Additionally, developing country
leaders may negotiate PTAs because they believe
implementation to be easy. Since both economic
reforms and PTA negotiations increase over time,
uncovering causality is further complicated.
FIGURE 1 Leader Change, Democratization, and PTA Negotiations
32For robustness, we estimated a variety of models using
alternative coding schemes for democratization and leader
change. The coefficient for simultaneous leader change and
democratization is positive in all models and statistically signif-
icant in 103 of 108 models. Similarly, we verified that possible
measurement error in negotiation onset is not a problem.
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We begin by examining the timing of economic
reform countries that negotiate a PTA at some point.
Within this sample, there are several outcomes that
would falsify our theory. First, there are few structural
breaks in the data. Second, structural breaks begin
already before PTA negotiations. Finally, we can com-
pare the frequency of structural breaks with and without
leader change, with and without democratization.
Next, we conduct a structured comparison with
countries that do negotiate a PTA at any point in
time. To ensure that these countries are comparable
with those that do negotiate a PTA, we first use a
matching technique to achieve a balance between
relevant covariates, such as GDP per capita. Done this
way, the comparison is not between apples and oranges.
If we find few structural breaks in the control group, it
supports the view that PTAs induce economic reform.
We use a technique called rolling regression. First,
we form an estimation sample of 10 consecutive
years, such as 1980–1989. We then regress the value
of a reform indicator, such as privatization, on time.
Thus, we are constructing a linear trend in the reform
indicator. Second, we use the estimated trend over
these years to predict the value of the reform in-
dicator in the following year. If the prediction is
precise, there is no structural break in the data. If the
prediction is poor, there is a structural break in
the data because the historical trend fails to explain
the following year. Technically, the precision of a
prediction is based on a statistical significance test on
the R2 and mean squared error of the time series
when the last year is added.
We repeat this exercise for several reform indica-
tors and as many years as possible. For example, if we
have data for years 1970–2007, we first use 1970–79 as
our estimation sample to predict the value of a reform
indicator in 1980. We then use 1971–1980 to predict
the value of that indicator 1981. Finally, we use years
1997–2006 to predict the value of the indicator in
2007. If we identify an upward shift in the data during
PTA negotiations or immediately after signature, we
code it as a structural break.
Economic Reform Data
We use data on four forms of economic reform. First,
we explore financial liberalization using a new indicator,
KAOPEN (Chinn and Ito 2008). It includes four major
categories on the restrictions on external accounts: the
presence of multiple exchange rates; restrictions on
current account transactions; restrictions on capital-
account transactions; and a requirement to surrender
export proceeds. Capital-account liberalization is a use-
ful proxy for politically contentious reforms given that it
has large distributive effects and often provokes domes-
tic opposition (Mukherjee and Singer 2010). This index
ranges from -1.80 to 2.54. High values imply less
stringent restrictions, or financial liberalization.
Second, we examine IPRs. IPR protection is a
contentious issue in developing countries, as many
interest groups can expect benefits from piracy and
reverse engineering in the absence of robust IPR
protection (Sell 2003).33 We measure the number of
legislative acts protecting IPR approved by the national
legislature in developing country i in year t, labeled.
High values of this variable imply strict IPR regula-
tions. The data are compiled by the authors from the
World Intellectual Property Organization dataset.34
Third, we measure privatization as the proceeds
in trillions of dollars from the privatization of com-
panies every year t. Privatization reduces the size of the
public sector and thus provokes opposition among
public sector employees and beneficiaries of the public
services provided. Data are from the World Bank
Privatization Dataset (Kikeri and Perault 2009).
Finally, we use an investment-profile measure from
the International Country Risk Guide.35 According to
Bu¨the and Milner (2008), PTAs hold potential for
improving FDI policy in developing countries. Thus,
we search for structural breaks in the general quality of
FDI policy in countries that did (and did not) negotiate
a PTA with the EU and the United States. This measure
focuses on investor perceptions, so it allows us to
obtain a different view of PTA effects on reform.
The descriptive statistics for the rolling analyses can
be found in the supplementary appendix.36
Results
The results of the rolling analysis offer evidence in
support of our second hypothesis. An overview is
33To be sure, IPR reform is not necessarily ‘‘liberal’’ in that
it imposes constraints on economic activity. However, from an
EU/U.S. perspective, it qualifies as an important economic
reform (Sell 2003).
34See http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (accessed in
December 2010).
35See http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx.
36Due to missing data, we lost the following PTA negotiations in
Eastern Europe around the year 1990: Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. This stacks the deck against finding evidence for our
hypothesis because post communist countries were clearly among
the most ambitious reformers in the aftermath of the Cold War.
We also cannot estimate a rolling regression for PTA negotiations
initiated in 2006 or 2007 because not enough time has passed to
identify a possible structural break. We drop observations of failed
negotiations because they should not be able to induce reform.
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provided in Table 2. The table shows the proportion
of developing countries that implemented types of
reforms, separately for PTA-negotiating and non-
negotiating countries. Furthermore, the association
between PTA negotiations and economic is presented
separately for the EU and the United States. In every
category, PTA negotiations are associated with an
increase in the economic reform rate.
Let us begin with IPR legislation. We were able to
conduct the analysis for 36 dyads. We found clear
evidence of a structural break for 15 of the 36 dyads.
Of these, seven structural breaks were found during
the negotiations and the other eight within five years
from signature. As an illustration, Figure 2 shows the
reform patterns for EU-Algeria (signature), EU-Poland
(signature), United States-Jordan (negotiations), and
United States-El Salvador (signature). The figure shows
that the IPR effects have occurred both during and after
negotiations and that the departures from the status
quo were abrupt. This pattern is consistent with the
notion that the leader and/or the EU and the United
States saw the PTA as a window of opportunity to
implement major economic reforms.
For capital account openness, we only found
enough data to estimate the rolling model for 29 dyads.
Of these, only five indicated a structural break during
the negotiations. It seems that the association between
PTA formation and capital-account liberalization
is weaker than for the other two reforms that we
have investigated. As an example, the supplemen-
tary appendix shows reform patters for EU-Chile
(negotiations), EU-Egypt (negotiations), United
States-Colombia (negotiations), and United States-
Korea (negotiations).
Third, we consider privatization. We found enough
data to estimate the rolling model for 30 dyads.
Of these, 11 indicated a structural break during the
negotiations and another nine within five years of
signature. The findings are illustrated in the supplemen-
tary appendix for EU-Macedonia (signature), EU-South
Africa (negotiations), United States-Costa Rica
(signature), United States-Oman (negotiations).
TABLE 2 PTA Negotiations and Frequency of
Economic Reform
Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU U.S. Non-PTA p-Value
IPR 0.41 0.58 0.13 0.01**
Privatization 0.50 0.58 0.31 0.00***
Capital Openness 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.07*
Investment Profile 0.45 0.37 0.22 0.09*
Any 0.86 0.61 0.48 0.00***
Note: If we compare the frequency of reform in the combined
EU/US PTA and non-PTA groups, the difference is statistically
significant at the conventional level for all four reform indicators
(two-tailed t-test). Column (4) shows the p-value for this test.
***p, 0.01; **p, 0.05; *p, 0.1.
FIGURE 2 PTA Formation and Cumulative IPR Legislation
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Finally, we present the results for the investment
profile variable. We were able to complete the esti-
mation for 30 dyads. Of them, nine showed a struc-
tural break during negotiations and six within five
years of signature. To illustrate, we show the data for
four PTAs in the supplementary appendix: EU-South
Africa (negotiations), EU-Poland (signature), United
States-Vietnam (signature), and United States-Nicaragua
(negotiations).
In total, we found that 30 of the 40 dyads with some
available data showed a structural break for at least one
of the reform indicators. The fact that a structural break
was found in approximately 75% of the cases, despite
missing data for some of the most probable reformers in
Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, is
strongly consistent with our theoretical argument.
We found few structural breaks for countries that
did not negotiate a PTA at any time but were compa-
rable in regard to other key covariates.37 Whereas 30
of the 40 dyads with a PTA showed a structural break
during or within five years from PTA negotiations, in
the group of countries without PTA negotiations only
20 of the 42 countries showed one or more structural
breaks for a comparable time frame.38 Only seven of
the countries had a structural break in the IPR data,
while nine of 37 had such a break in privatization and
two of 25 had a break in capital account liberalization.
In investment profile, 20 of 42 countries had a struc-
tural break.39
Differences in Differences
To further test the relationship between PTA forma-
tion and economic reforms, we conducted a conven-
tional differences-in-differences analysis. This analysis
does not emphasize structural breaks and is less flexible
than the rolling regression, but it allows us to analyze
the entire sample and control for confounding varia-
bles. Moreover, we can offer a rigorous characteriza-
tion of the confidence intervals around the estimates.
Using the matched sample, we compared economic
reform trends before and after either PTA negotiations
began or the treaty was signed. For each of the four
reform indicators, we estimated the economic reform
trends for countries that did and did not negotiate a
PTA with the EU or the United States. With the ex-
ception of capital account openness, for which
there were few structural breaks in the rolling
analysis, we found that economic reforms accel-
erated in PTA-negotiating countries after PTA
negotiations began. The difference in reform pace
was also statistically significant at the p﹤0.01 level.
These results are consistent with those from the
rolling regression analysis.
Additional Evidence
The appendix provides a series of additional tests. First,
we found that reforms implemented under PTA forma-
tion are rarely reversed. This stands in stark contrast to
the overall pattern of liberalization; in general, reforms
are often reversed. This supports the interpretation that
PTA formation allows leaders to tie their, and their
successors’, hands (Bu¨the and Milner 2008).
Second, we examined if economic crises explain
our finding. While PTA negotiations often follow an
economic crisis, economic crises without leader change
and democratization do not increase the probability
of PTA negotiations. This suggests that economic
crisis is not the underlying driver of PTA negotiations.
Instead, both leader change and democratization seem
to play an important role.
Third, we examined whether our results hold if
exclude two geopolitically important regions, namely
the Middle East and North Africa. Especially for the
United States, PTAs in these region may have been
influenced by security considerations, and especially
the search for allies in war on terror. We found that
our results were robust to excluding these regions.
Finally, elsewhere we have examined the effect of
EU/U.S. PTA formation on bilateral foreign aid
(Baccini and Urpelainen 2012). We found that the EU
and the United States significantly increase foreign aid in
sectors that require economic reform for approximately
five years following PTA signature. However, the effect
disappears over time. This finding suggests that the EU
and the United States complement PTA negotiations
with foreign aid for economic reform.
Conclusion
How do international institutions influence domestic
politics, and how do the anticipated institutional effects
37See the supplementary appendix for the matching technique we
used.
38Specifically, we randomly selected a seven-year time period
(average length of negotiations plus five years for countries that
did engage in negotiations) for each such country and examined
the occurrence of structural breaks during that time.
39In the supplementary appendix, we also examine conditional
patterns. Leader change strengthens the association between PTA
formation and economic reform, and this association is partic-
ularly strong given leader change under democratization. Perhaps
surprisingly, we also found little evidence for IMF effects.
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influence a leader’s decision to pursue membership in
such institutions? We have used data on EU/U.S. PTA
negotiations to examine whether developing country
leaders strategically use these agreements to promote
economic reform. New leaders facing difficult political
circumstances under democratization are particularly
dependent on the credible commitment and domestic
side payments that EU/U.S. PTAs allow. The combi-
nation of recent leader change and democratization
increase the probability of PTA negotiations, and
EU/U.S. PTAs induce significant reforms.
Leaders apply for membership in international
institutions to reap tangible domestic political benefits.
We provide direct empirical evidence that individual
leaders use international institutions to advance
domestic reforms. Furthermore, we complement
those previous studies that have found reform effects
for IMF programs (Pop-Eleches 2009; Vreeland 2003)
and EU accession negotiations (Mattli and Plu¨mper
2004).
Bilateral economic institutions with major powers
and enforceable, legally binding obligations hold par-
ticular potential for promoting economic reform.
These conditions provide the basis for future research
on the international determinants of economic reform.
For example, the generalizability of our argument
could be explored by evaluating whether domestic
political factors, such as leader change and democra-
tization, have different effects on suitable bilateral
economic institutions, such as investment treaties,
and less suitable ones, such as multilateral scientific
organizations.
Fragile democratic transitions in the Middle
East underscore the policy importance of our
study. If the EU and the United States are to sup-
port democratization and economic liberalization
in the Middle East, including Egypt and Libya,
trade agreements offer a useful policy instrument.
Leaders who need economic reform but face
domestic political opposition to it can engage in
PTA negotiations to create new constituencies for
economic reform. Additionally, PTA formation
enables credible commitment to liberalization.
By deepening economic cooperation with democ-
ratizing countries, the EU and the United States
can promote lasting political-economic change in
geopolitically important partner countries.
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